

## Source Notes

These are the sources used, quoted, or paraphrased in this publication. They are listed by page number. Where material appears in a paragraph, both page and paragraph number are listed. Boldface indicates the titles of historical vignettes.

### Introduction

- vii “How one understands command and control depends on the perspective...”: paraphrased from Thomas P. Coakley, *Command and Control for War and Peace* (Washington, DC: National Defense Univ. Press: GPO, 1992) (hereafter cited as Coakley), 9–15.
- vii **The Battle Of Arbelá (331 BC)**: based on Anthony Livesey, *Great Commanders and Their Battles* (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 8–19; and Simon Goodenough, *Tactical Genius in Battle*, ed. Len Deighton (London: Phaidon, 1979), 67–70.

### Chapter 1—Command and Control

- 1-10 “War is the realm of uncertainty;...”: Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976; reprint, First Princeton Paperback, 1989) (hereafter cited as Clausewitz), 101.
- 1-12 pars. 1-55–1-60. The discussion of the challenges of land-force and land-combat operations is based on GEN Paul F. Gorman, as quoted and discussed in Kenneth Allard, *Command, Control, and the Common Defense*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: National Defense Univ. Press: GPO, 1996), 158–188.
- 1-15 Figure 1-4. Adapted from Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6, *Command and Control* (Washington, DC: GPO, 04 Oct. 1996) (hereafter cited as MDCP 6), 81.
- 1-15 “no plan...extends...”: Helmuth von Moltke, *Moltke’s Military Works*, vol. 4, *War Lessons, Part I, “Operative Preparations for Battle”* (Berlin: Mittler, 1911), quoted in Hans Delbrück, *History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History*, vol. 4, *The Modern Era*, trans. by Walter J. Renfro, Jr. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985), 425.
- 1-21 **Command and Control at Chancellorsville**: based on Stephen W. Sears, *Chancellorsville* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996) (hereafter cited as Sears); James M. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1988); and Shelby Foote, *The Civil War: A Narrative*, vol. 2, *Fredericksburg to Meridian* (New York: Random House, 1963) (hereafter cited as Foote).
- 1-22 “I not only expected victory,...”: as quoted in Foote, 262.
- 1-24 “My plans are perfect,...”: as quoted in Foote, 262. See also Sears, 120.

### Chapter 2—Command

- 2-1 “The criterion by which a commander...”: *Field Service Regulations: Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO: 22 May 1941; reprint, Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1992), 24.
- 2-1 “To command is to do more...”: Roger H. Nye, *The Challenge of Command: Reading for Military Excellence* (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group, 1986), 28.
- 2-5 par. 2-17: “the quick recognition of a truth...”: Clausewitz, 102.
- 2-6 par. 2-22: “As each man’s strength gives out...”: Clausewitz, 104.
- 2-6 “There will be neither time nor opportunity...”: as quoted in Thomas B. Buell, *Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), 521.
- 2-7 “I suppose dozens of operation orders...”: William Slim, *Defeat Into Victory* (London: Cassell, 1956; reprint New York: David McKay, 1961), (hereafter cited as Slim) 210–211.

- 2-11 "It is my design if...": Ulysses S. Grant, *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant*, vol. 10, January 1–May 31, 1864, ed. John Y. Simon (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1982) (hereafter cited as *Papers*), 251-252.
- 2-11 "That we are now all to act...": *Papers*, 253–254 note.
- 2-115 "Next to a battle lost...": as quoted in *The Greenhill Dictionary of Military Quotations*, ed. Peter G. Tsouras, (Mechanicsville, PA: Stackpole Books, 2000) (hereafter cited as Tsouras), 51.
- 2-19 "A commander has...": Harold G. Moore and Joseph Galloway, *We Were Soldiers Once...and Young* (New York: Random House, 1992), 113.
- 2-24 Calculated Risk or Military Gamble? Operation HAWTHORNE, Dak To, Vietnam: based on John M. Carland, *Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide, May 1965 to October 1966, The United States Army in Vietnam*, CMH Pub 91-5 (Washington DC: Center of Military History, US Army: GPO, 2000), 277–287.
- 2-25 Resolve: Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli: based on George W. Gawrych, "The Rock of Gallipoli," in *Studies in Battle Command* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College: GPO, 1995), 87–96.
- 2-27 Obstinacy: Frederick the Great at Kunersdorf: based on Scott Stephenson, "Old Fritz Stumbles: Frederick the Great at Kunersdorf, 1759," in *Studies in Battle Command* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College: GPO, 1995), 13–20.
- 2-30 Establishing and Using Commander's Intent: VII Corps and the Ruhr Encirclement: based on William M. Connor, "Establishing Command Intent, A Case Study: The Encirclement of the Ruhr, March 1945," in *The Human In Command: Exploring The Modern Military Experience*, ed. Carol McCann and Ross Pigeau (Toronto, Canada: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Press, 2000), 93–110.

### Chapter 3—Control

- 3-1 "The test of control...": The Infantry Journal. *Infantry in Battle*, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal, 1939; reprint, Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College: GPO, 1981), 169.
- 3-2 "Many...reports in war are contradictory...": Clausewitz, 117.
- 3-2 "Everything in war is simple ....": Clausewitz, 119, 121.
- 3-19 Crosstalk in the Desert: VII Corps in the Gulf War: based on TRADOC Pam 525-100-1, *Leadership and Command on the Battlefield: Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM* (Fort Monroe, VA: HQ, TRADOC, 1992) (hereafter cited as TRADOC Pam 525-100-1), 28.
- 3-22 "...avoid taking 'firm control' or a 'tight rein'...." paraphrased from *Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevskii*, by Richard E Simpkin and John Erickson (London: Brassey's Defence, 1987), 150.
- 3-24 Control in Command and Control: Austerlitz: based on David G. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon* (New York, Macmillan Co., 1966), 402–432.

### Chapter 4—The Role of the Commander

- 4-1 "When he looked at a map, Zhukov ...": A. Chakovskly, *The Blockade*, quoted in D.A. Ivanov et al., *Fundamentals Of Tactical Command And Control: A Soviet View*, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1977); trans. US Air Force, Soviet Military Thought, no. 18 (Washington, DC: GPO, no date), 203.
- 4-10 "...one of the most difficult things...": Adolph von Schell, *Battle Leadership* (Fort Benning, GA: Benning Herald, 1933; reprint, Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 1999), 55.
- 4-15 "Morale is a state of mind...": Slim, 182.
- 4-15 "Judgment comes from experience...": Simon Bolivar Buckner, as quoted by Omar N. Bradley, "Leadership: An Address to the US Army War College, 07 Oct. 71," *Parameters* 1 (3) (1972): 8.
- 4-18 "Benteen. Come on...": as quoted in John S. Gray, *Custer's Last Campaign: Mitch Boyer and the Little Bighorn Reconstructed* (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1991), 281.
- 4-18 "More than 50 percent of battle command in VII Corps was nonelectric...": as quoted in TRADOC Pam 525-100-1, 34.
- 4-18 "There is no alternative...": as quoted in Martin van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1985), 199.
- 4-18 "Magnificent, But Not War": Misunderstood Orders and the Charge of the Light Brigade: based on John Sweetman, *Balaclava, 1854: The Charge of the Light Brigade* (London: Osprey, 1990); and Cecil Woodham-Smith, *The Reason Why* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954).

- 4-20 “General Meade was an officer of merit with drawbacks...”: Ulysses S. Grant, *Memoirs and Selected Letters: Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, Selected Letters, 1839-1865*, vol. 2, *Personal Memoirs*, ed. William S. Mc Feely and Mary Drake McFeely (New York: Library of America, 1990), 770. [Online] Available <http://ibiblio.org/gutenberg/etext97/2musg12.txt>
- 4-23 “Like the great artist the general...”: J.F.C. Fuller, *Generalship: Its Diseases and their Cure: A Study of the Personal Factor in Command* (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing, 1936; reprint, Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College: GPO, 1987), 87.
- 4-23 “No man is more valiant than Yessoutai...”: as quoted in Rashid ad-Din, *Sbornik Letopisei (Collected Chronicles)*, vol. I/2 (Moscow-Leningrad: Gosizdat, 1952), trans. O.I. Smirnova, 261–262, as quoted in Harold Lamb, *Genghis Khan: The Emperor of All Men* (New York: Robert McBride, 1927; reprint, New York: Doubleday, 1956), 46.
- 4-23 “He [Napoleon] fell from the height of greatness...”: Antoine Henri de Jomini, *Treatise on Grand Military Operations*, trans. S.B. Holabird (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1865), as quoted in UK Army Doctrinal Publication 2, *Command* (London: Chief of General Staff, Apr. 1995), 2-14.
- 4-25 “One of the most valuable qualities of a commander...”: William Slim, *Unofficial History* (New York: David McKay, 1962), 156.
- 4-28 “[Rommel] believed...in commanding from the front...”: David Fraser, *Knight’s Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel*, 1st US edition (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 161.
- 4-28 Forward Command: LTG Eichelberger at Buna: based on Thomas M. Huber, “Eichelberger at Buna: A Study in Battle Command,” in *Studies in Battle Command* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College: GPO, 1995), 123–128.

#### Chapter 5—The Command and Control System

- 5-19 “I will only invite your attention to...”: George C. Marshall, “Development in Tactics,” undated lecture, US Army Infantry School (1928–1933), in *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall: vol. 1, The Soldierly Spirit, December 1880–June 1939* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1981), ed. Larry Bland and Sharon R. Ritenour, 334–335.

#### Chapter 6—Exercising Command and Control

- 6-0 “The great end...”: paraphrased from Robert D. Heinl Jr., *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations* (Annapolis: US Naval Institute, 1966), 1.
- 6-18 “Only in very rare cases can an army...”: F.W. von Mellenthin, *Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War*, 1st American ed., trans. H. Betzler; ed. by L.C.F. Turner (Norman, OK: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1956), 94.
- 6-20 “If I always appeared prepared...”: as quoted in Tsouras, 363.
- 6-20 pars. 6-77–6-130: The doctrine for decisionmaking during execution is based on, among other sources, Dennis K. Leedom, et al., *Final Report: Cognitive Engineering of the Human-Computer Interface for ABCS* (Andover, MA: Dynamics Research Corporation, 1998); and Gary Klein, *Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998).

#### Appendix A—The Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) Cycle

- A-3 par. A-7. based on Robert L. Bateman III, “Avoiding Information Overload,” *Military Review* 77 (4) (1998): 54–55.

#### Appendix B—Information

- B-1 The cognitive hierarchy and discussion of it are based on MCDP 6, 66–71; JP 6-0, *Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support for Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 30 May 1995), I-3–I-4; and Jeffrey R. Cooper, “The Coherent Battlefield—Removing the ‘Fog of War’” (unpublished paper: SRS Technologies, Jun. 1993), as cited in MCDP 6, 143.